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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a tamper detecting method for images using
mathematical morphology. The proposed method utilizes the idem-
potent property of morphological operations rather than fragile wa-
termarking methods. While fragile watermarking methods that must
extract the embedded watermark and compare it with the possible
watermark to detect tampers, the proposed method detects and lo-
calizes tampers by only morphological operations and image sub-
traction in the spatial domain. Moreover, a visual signature system
is proposed based on the proposed tamper detecting method. Exper-
imental results show the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Index Terms— Image processing, Security, Multimedia com-
munication, Authentication, Tampering detection
1. INTRODUCTION
By using high-performance computers and powerful software, the
novice as well as the professional easily modify digital images. This
advantage introduces malicious tamper of images into our lives. To
detect tampering, digital signature [1,2] and robust hash [3] has been
used widely, besides non-intrusive methods [4] that does not process
images at the image creation.
A digital signature is generated from an image. It needs to be
stored and/or transmitted separately from the image itself, but in
many cases, separation is undesirable. To overcome this undesir-
ability, methods which hide digital signature into the image itself
have been proposed. These methods are refer to as fragile water-
marking [5, 6]. These methods, however, require to compare the
extracted watermark and possible watermarks to detect tampering,
and this process increases computational consumption.
On the other hand, mathematical morphology [7,8], one of non-
linear processing, has been widely studied in the non security re-
lated fields. It is generally used for noise removal or edge detection.
This paper focuses mathematical morphology, but for security re-
lated problem; image tamper detection.
This paper proposes a novel tamper detecting method for im-
ages. The proposed method utilizes the idempotent property of op-
erations in mathematical morphology. Whereas fragile watermark-
ing methods embed, extract, and compare watermarks, the proposed
method processes the image by one morphological operation in the
spatial domain. Furthermore, the proposed method simultaneously
localizes the tampered area. In addition, a visual signature system
based on the proposed tamper detecting method is also proposed.
2. MATHEMATICAL MORPHOLOGY
2.1. Morphological Operations for Binary Images
There are two kinds of basic morphological operations called erosion
and dilation.
(a) Original. (b) Eroded. (c) Dilated. (d) Opened.
Fig. 1. An example of dilation, erosion and opening of a binary
image by using a 9×9 square-shaped structuring element.
Erosion is defined by the following equation using Minkowski
subtraction:
ABs = ∩{A−b : −b ∈ B}, (1)
where A is binary image, B is structuring element (SE), b is unit el-
ement of B, and Bs is reflected set of B; i.e. Bs = ∪b∈B{−b}. To
erode A by B, A is firstly translated by −b, and then the all translated
results are combined by intersection. In general, the erosion opera-
tion shrinks the image. The image shown in Fig. 1 (b) is obtained by
eroding Fig. 1 (a) by 9×9 square-shaped SE.
To enlarge the image, the dilation is applied, which is defined by
the following equation using Minkowski addition:
A⊕Bs = ∪{A−b : −b ∈ B}. (2)
To dilate A by B, A is firstly translated by −b, and then the all trans-
lated results are combined by union. Fig. 1 (c) shows the image
obtained through dilating Fig. 1 (a) by a 9×9 square-shaped SE.
By cascading the above mentioned basic operations, further op-
erations are able to be defined. One of them is opening that consists
of dilation and cascading erosion. It is noted that both basic opera-
tions use the identical SE. Opening A by B generates AB that is given
as
AB = (ABs)⊕B. (3)
Opening Fig. 1 (a) by a 9×9 square-shaped SE gives Fig. 1 (d).
2.2. Morphological Operations for Grayscale Images
Erosion and dilation for grayscale images are defined by following:
( f gs)(x) = min
x+u∈Fu∈G
{ f (x+u)}, (4)
( f ⊕gs)(x) = max
u∈G
{ f (x+u)}, (5)
where f (x) is the grayscale image with its domain F and g(u) is zero
value held SE with domain G. In erosion, the origin of SE g(u) is
put on focused pixel f (x) in domain F , then f (x) is altered with the
minimum pixel value in domain G. Dilation is operated in the same
way as erosion, but maximum value in domain G is chosen.



















Fig. 2. Block diagram of the proposed tamper detecting method.
Opening of grayscale images is denoted fg and defined by
fg = ( f gs)⊕g. (6)
2.3. Idempotence Property of Opening
The morphological opening operations for both binary and grayscale
images have algebraic property called idempotence:
(AB)B = AB, (7)
( fg)g = fg. (8)
Since opening is idempotent, once an image is opened by a SE, the
identical image is obtained through opening the opened image by the
identical SE.
In the next section, tamper detecting method using the idempo-
tence property of mathematical morphology is proposed.
3. PROPOSED IMAGE TAMPER DETECTING METHOD
3.1. Algorithm
The proposed method consists of two parts as shown in Fig. 2; One
is preprocessing and the other is tamper detecting. The algorithm is
accomplished according to the following steps.
1. Open original image Io by SE k to obtain authorized image
Io,o as shown in Fig. 2 (a). Generated image Io,o is to be
distributed or transmitted.
2. Open image It , that is tampered version of Io,o, by SE k to
obtain opened image It,o. Then, image Id is acquired by cal-
culate the absolute difference image with the following equa-
tion:
Id = |It − It,o| . (9)
On account of the idempotence property of opening, once the
image had applied the opening operation, no-further change would
occur by the repeated opening operations under the conditions that
it had opened by the same SE. Existence of dofferemce between It,o
and It means that It have been tampered with.
Therefore, this method detects tamper by checking Id’s pixel val-
ues; It is tampered if one or more pixels of Id have non-zero value.
The tampered area can also be detected by this method.
3.2. Variables of the Proposed Method
The proposed method has three variables. Followings can be con-
trolled by regulating each variable.
• Quality of authorized image Io,o.
• Tamper detecting ability.
Three variables are described through the next three sections.
3.2.1. Shape and/or Size of the Used Structuring Element
Authorized image Io,o is altered from original image Io by an open-
ing operation. The alteration depends on the used SE. The shape
and/or the size of the used SE are able to be selected by the user,
according to the purpose or type of target images.
3.2.2. Area to Apply Opening Operation in an Image
To detect tampers on expressly important part in an image, opening
operation need to be done only for the specific area. Size of the area
and/or the number of areas to be opened can be chosen flexibly in
the proposed method.
3.2.3. Bitplanes to be Opened
An N-bits quantized grayscale image can be regarded as the com-
bined N pieces of binary images. That is, the n-th bitplane (1 ≤ n ≤
N) of N bits grayscale image Io can be regarded as an one-bit binary
image, and the opening for binary images is able to be used.
Besides, the n1-th to the n2-th bitplanes (1 ≤ n1 ≤ n2 ≤ N) of N-
bits grayscale image Io can be regarded as n2 −n1 +1-bits grayscale
sub-image, and opening operation for grayscale image is able to be
applied.
3.3. Features of the Proposed Method
The proposed method utilizes the idempotent property of the math-
ematical morphology operation to detect tamper on images. Since
opening used in the proposed method is operated in the spatial do-
main, no transformation such as discrete Fourier transformation, dis-
crete cosine transformation, or discrete wavelet transformation is re-
quired. This reduces the computational consumption.
Furthermore, in this method, detection of tamper existence only
requires checking whether the absolute difference image has non-
zero pixels or not. Moreover, localization of the tampered area is si-
multaneously done. Whereas, fragile watermarking method requires
watermark extraction and comparing the extracted watermark and
the embedded watermark to detect tamper existence. It can be bit-by-
bit comparison or calculating the correlation between watermarks.
In fragile watermarking methods, further operations are needed for
tampered area localization.
The proposed method is capable to control the image quality
of a preprocessed image and tamper detecting ability by regulating
variables. These variables also serve as secret keys. In particular,
an SE plays an important role in a secrecy aspect. The shape and
the size of an SE are flexible and many kinds of SE patterns can
be generated. Attackers, therefore, hardly slip through a detecting
system by finding out the used SE.
The effectiveness of the proposed method is shown in Sect. 5.
4. FURTHER APPLICATION
In this section, a visual signature system is proposed. The proposed
system is based on the image tamper detecting method proposed in
the previous section. That is, applying the proposed image tamper



























Fig. 3. Block diagram of the proposed visual signature system.




Fig. 4. An example of visual signature.
4.1. Visual Signature
Visual signature is able to be signed by applying the morphological
opening operation to signature area. This signature system utilizes
the variable of the proposed tamper detecting method, area to apply
opening that is described in Sect. 3.2.2. The block diagram of the
proposed visual signature system is shown in Fig. 3.
The signing algorithm is accomplished according to the follow-
ing steps.
1. Calculate product set of original image Io and signature image
Is, e.g., Fig. 4 (a), to obtain signature-shaped image Is,s. Cal-
culate the difference image of Io and Is,s to obtain signature
clipped out image Io,c.
2. Open Is,s by SE k to obtain signature opened image Is,o.
3. Calculate union set of Io,c and Is,o to obtain signed image Io,s
(Fig. 4 (b)).
Signature image Is is a binary image having the same size as Io.
Pixel values in signature area are 1’s and in other area are 0’s in Is.
In Step 1, Io is separated into signature area Is,s and rest area Io,c by
multiplexing Is and Io. In Step 2, opening by SE k is only applied to
signature area. In Step 3, opened signature area and the other area
are combined to generate signed images Io,s.
The authentication algorithm is accomplished according to the
following steps.
1. Open Io,s by k to obtain opened image Io,s,o.
2. Calculate the absolute difference image of Io,s and Io,s,o to
obtain visualized signature image Iv,s (Fig. 4 (c)).
In Step 1, whole area of Io,s is opened by SE k. Signature area of Io,s
has already been opened in Step 2 of the signing algorithm, so pixel
values in signature area are not changed by this operation because of
idempotence. Whereas the rest area of Io,s has not been opened yet,
the pixel values are changed. The signature areas in Io,s and Io,s,o
have the exactly same pixel values, the signature area in Iv,s consists
of zero pixels. Besides, the rest area of Io,s differs from Io,s,o from the
perspective of pixel values, this area has non-zero pixels. Therefore,
the visual signature appears in Iv,s in Step 2.
4.2. Visual Signature for Texts Contained Binary Images
In a texts contained binary image, such as a spreadsheet image, pix-
els on neighboring area hold the same value. This feature introduces
two things to be overcome to the visual signature system proposed
in the previous section.
One is degrading the quality of signed images. The other is that
pixel values in background area lasting the same pixel values are not
changed by opening operation. That is, signature signing is hard.
To overcome these problems, insertion of background image is
proposed. To insert a background image, extend the binary image
to an N-bit image which keeps the original binary image as its most
significant bitplane (MSB). An N − 1-bits background image is in-
serted to bitplanes of the least significant bit (LSB) to the N − 1-th
bit. Then, morphological opening can be applied to any area and/or
bitplanes except for the MSB. Further improvements for random-
ness of neighbor pixels in a bitplane can be achieved. An example
of visual signature on a spreadsheet image is shown in Fig. 5.
(a) Original spreadsheet image (b) Signature Image
(c) Signed image (d) Visualized signature
Fig. 5. An example of visual signature on a spreadsheet image
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, two experimental results are shown; one is the image
quality of preprocessed images and the other is the tamper detecting
ability of the proposed method. Experimental conditions are sum-
marized in Table 1. Lena shown in Fig. 6 (a) is used as original im-
age Io. Employed SEs, k’s, are 1× 2 rectangular-shaped, and 3× 3
and 9× 9 square-shaped as shown in Fig. 7. Tamper is applied to
eyes, eyelashes, and eyebrows, of preprocessed Lena Io,o as shown
in Fig. 6 (b) and (c).
Fig. 8 shows the preprocessed images Io,o in its left column and
detected tampers Id in its right column. Id’s are processed for easy
looking. From Figs. 8 (a), (b), and (c), the qualities of Io,o are af-
fected by the size of the used SEs. The images opened by larger SE
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Table 1. Experiment conditions.
Image Io Lena (512×512 pixels, 8 bits grayscale)
Structuring 1×2 rectangular-shaped,
element k 3×3 and 9×9 square-shaped
Bitplanes whole 8 bits as grayscale,
LSB only as binary
Area the whole image
(a) Lena. (b) Tamper. (c) Tampered image It .
Fig. 6. Conditions of images for experiments.
have lower PSNRs. On the other hand, larger SE is used, clearer
tamper existence appears. It is found that the proposed method is
capable of controlling the trade-off between the image quality of Io,o
and the tamper detecting ability by choosing SEs.
Figure 8 (d) shows that the opening operation for bitplanes is ef-
fective to reduce the degradation of the image quality after opening.
It is also found that the proposed method controls above mentioned
trade-off by choosing the area and/or bitplanes to be opened.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Tamper detecting method using mathematical morphology has been
proposed in this paper. The proposed method utilizes the idempotent
property of morphology. In addition, visual signature system has
been proposed based on the tamper detecting method. Investigation
on resilience to lossy compression such as JPEG is a further work.
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